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ABSTRACT: There is a growing need to present statistical scientific evidence in a form 
that judges and jurors can understand and eva1uate. After examining statistica1 issues 
surrounding forensie DNA evidence, this article presents research that demonstrates a way 
to improve judges' and jurors' understanding of evidence involving probabilities and 
statistics. 
CITATION: Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and Gerd Gigerenzer, Communicating 
Statistical DNA Evidence, 43 Jurimetrics J. 147-163 (2003). 
Advanees in forensic scienee over the last deeade are revolutionizing the 
possibilities of eriminal investigation. In partieular, the onee eontroversial use of 
DNA analyses to link previously identified suspeets to erimes l is being supple­
mented by large databases ofthe DNA types ofeonvieted offenders or arrestees. 2 
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for Human Deve1opment, Lentzeallee 94, 0 - 14195 Berlin, Germany. 
I. Christopher Anderson, Academy Approlles, Crilics Still Cry Foul, 356 NATIJRE 552 (1992); 
Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 NATIJRE 50 I (1989); R.C. Lewontin & Daniel 1. 
Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensie DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745 (1991); Williarn C. 
Thompson, Ella/uating the Admissibi/ity of New Genetie Identijication Tests: Lessons from the 
"DNA War," 84 J. CRlM. 1. & CRlMlNOLOGY 22 (1993). 
2. See, e.g., The DNAldentification Actof1994, 42 V.S.C. §§ 3751, 3753, 3793, 3797 (1994); 
Police and CriminaJ Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, §§ 62, 63, 63A, 64 (Eng.); Fred Barbash, Brilish 
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These databases make it possible to identify possible perpetrators ofcrimes from 
the DNA that is on file.) 
Unfortunately, the proper interpretation ofaDNA analysis is tangled in a web 
ofstatistical complexities that DNA databanks only exacerbate.4 There is thus a 
growing need to present such statistical scientific evidence in a form that judges 
and jurors can understand. This article examines some of the statistical issues 
surrounding forensic DNA evidence and the inferences they require. It then 
reviews psychological findings conceming how people respond to different forms 
of statistical information and offers a way, based on psychological research,s to 
spontaneously improve judges' andjurors' understanding ofevidence involving 
probabilities and statistics.6 
Part I discusses what DNA analyses can reveal, what they cannot, and how 
the two are easily confused. Part II examines the statistical inferences and 
Bayesian reasoning associated with forensic DNA analyses. Two experiments 
designed to address these issues are then presented, followed by a discussion of 
their legal implications. The results suggest that the choice of how to present 
statistics associated with DNA evidence may have significant legal consequences. 
I. FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 
A. Clarifying the Result 
A DNA analysis, by itself, can establish only that someone could be the 
source of a genetic evidentiary sampie. Whether that person is in fact the source 
depends on the integrity ofthe analysis, the rarity ofthe DNA profile in question, 
and any other evidence implying that the suspect is or is not the source of the 
evidence. 
Even if the suspect is in fact thesource, however, that does not mean he is 
guilty of any crime. There may be ample reason for genetic traces of someone 
other than the perpetrator to be at a crime scene. Altematively, those genetic 
traces could have come from someone who has never been there, if, for example, 
the evidence was planted. 
That said, it is not possible to identify the source of any genetic trace based 
on a DNA analysis alone, even if every individual, with the exception of 
monozygotic twins, ultimately has a uilique genotype. Many forensic DNA 
Authorities Launch Ist National DNA Database, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1995, at AIS; Nicholas 
Wade, F.B.!. Sello Open fis DNA Databasejor FighlingCrime. N.Y. TIMES, Ocl 12,1998, at Al. 
3. E.g., Michael Fleeman, First DNA Database "Hit" Leads 10 Arrest. ORANGECOUNTYREG., 
Nov.9, 1995, at A22. 
4. COMMITIEEON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL. THEEvALUAnON 
OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1997) [hereinafter NRC ll); Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, 
DNA Database Searches and Ihe Legal Consumption ojScien/ific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REv. 931 
(1999). 
5. Ulrich Hoffrage et al., Communicating Sta/is/icalfnjorma/ion, 290 SCIENCE 2261 (2000). 
6. Cf D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, CanJurors Unders/and Probabilislic Evidence? 154 
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profiles reflect only a limited number of the genotypic features that cannot 
reasonably be said to be unique. More than one person could have the same such 
DNA profile, just as more than one person could pick the same cornbination of 
numbers in a lottery, even though the probability of that particular cornbination 
winning is extrernely smalI. 
Although it is unlikely that a crirninal suspect would share a DNA profile 
with a piece ofincriminating evidence by coincidence, quantifying this probability 
requires estirnating the population frequency of the varying genetic features 
(alleles) in a specified reference class, such as a racial group.' In the simplest 
cornputation, the population frequencies of each of the varying genetic features 
are deemed to be inherited independently ofone another. They are then rnultiplied 
together, along with various coefficients, according to the product rule.8 The result 
is commonly known as the "randorn match probability," and it is tantamount to 
the chance of a DNA match by sheer coincidence. It is also the statistic usually 
reported to a judge or jury.9 This statistic indicates the estimated rarity of the 
DNA profile, although that specific figure may be misleading if it induces the 
factfinder to ignore the tnuch more Iikely chance ofa laboratory error or errors in 
subjective judgments made in interpreting the results. 'o Despite past expert 
testimony that false positive laboratory errors are impossible, 11 they do occur, and 
usually with a frequency several orders ofmagnitude higher than the chance of a 
coincidental match. 12 
All this applies equally to DNA matches found by searching through DNA 
databanks. However, as the number ofDNA profiles analyzed increases, so too 
does the likelihood offmding one that matches by chance alone. 1J DNA matches 
7. On the estimation of these frequencies, see NRC 11, supra note 4, at 21. As for which 
population is an appropriate reference dass, see Richard Lempert, The Suspect Population andDNA 
Identification, 34 JURlMETRlCS 1. 1 (1993); R.C. Lewontin, Which Popu.lation?, 52 AM. 1. HUM. 
GENETICS 205 (1993). 
8. This can produce infinitesimal numbers, the reciprocals of which are weil beyond the size 
ofthe human population. For example, the chance that the semen on Monica Lewinsky's dress was 
not former President Bill Clinton's was reported to be I out of7.87 trillion. Final Report ofthe Office 
ofthe Independent Counsel to the United States House ofRepresentatives, "Grounds," at § I(A)(4) 
(Sept. 9, 1998), available at http://icreport.access.gpo.gov/reportl2toc.htm. But even this 
infinitesimal number is consistent with a chance of I in 1,430 that someone else in a population of 
5.5 billion unrelated people shares this DNA profile. 
9. NRC II, supra note 4, at 192-204. 
10.Id. at 203; Jonathan J. Koehler et 8.1., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: 
Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURlMETRlCS J. 201 (1995); William C. Thompson, Subjective 
Interpretation, Laboratory Error, and the Value 0/Forensic DNA Evidence: Three Case Studies, 
96 GENETICA 153 (1995). 
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 662 N.E.2d 726,728 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). 
12. Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 245 (Md. 1996) (testimony that the rate offalse positive 
eITors could be as high as 0.7%); NRC 11, supra note 4, at 24-25, 85-87; Koehler et al., supra note 
10. The rate oflaboratory eITOrs wi 11 vary with indiv iduallaboratories, their techniques, and the types 
of proficiency tests. Experts can testify to errors even if there have not been any detected in 
proficiency tests. See Williams v. State, 679 A.2d 1106, 1118-20 (Md. 1996). 
13. The same is true of DNA analyses of sampies laken in mass police screenings of men 
residing in certain geographicaJ regions, which amOl.int to ad hoc DNA databanks. 
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found by searching a large databank at a small number of loci could identify 
people who have nothing to do with the crime in question. Again, as in a lottery, 
the chance that any one ticket matches the winning combination may be extremely 
smaU, but the chance that some combination on at least one of a large number of 
tickets matches may not be. 
Going through all the other tickets is sure to find the winner eventually, and 
the chance of fmding it before going through all the tickets improves with each 
ticket examined. 14 The more sampies analyzed, the more likely it becomes to find 
a match purely by chance. How much more likely is a direct function of the 
number of sampies examined, so the chance of a random match must take into 
consideration the size ofthe databank. 15 But that does not change the fundamental 
question of whether the person whose DNA profile matches the evidentiary 
sampie is in fact its source. 16 
B. Confusing the Result 
Whatever statistics are reported with the results of a DNA analysis, the 
interpretation of its probative value is ultimately left to the courts. But these 
results are widely confused and misinterpreted-byjudges,jurors, and sometimes 
even DNA experts themselves. The estimated population frequency of a DNA 
profile has often been misinterpreted, for example, as the chance that an accused 
person is innocent, for example, "a one in 5 billion chance that anybody else could 
have committed the crime.,,17 Even the president ofthe Deutschen Gesellschaft 
für Rechtsmedizin (German Society for Forensic Medicine) stated that a DNA 
match identifies a perpetrator with 100% certainty.18 
The rarity ofthe DNA profile (or its complement) is also misinterpreted as 
the likelihood that some person is not (or is) the source of DNA evidence. A 
leading European expert assurnes in his calculations that it is certain (Le., p = I) 
that a matching defendant is the source of the evidence, and it is FBI policy to 
infer the defendant is the source if the profile frequency is smaller than I in 260 
billion. '9 Other DNA experts have misinterpreted the profile frequency as the 
probability that the DNA evidence came from anyone other than the defendant. 
14. Assuming there is at least one ticket with a winning combination in the lottery, or at least 
one DNA sampIe with a matching profile in the databank. 
15. The situation is slighlly more complicated depending on the specifics of the case. For a 
detailed analysis, see Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 4. 
16. Nor does it diminish the diagnostic vaJue ofthe DNA evidence. Contrary to the conclusions 
ofthe National Research Council, testing and eJiminating others as potential sources ofthe evidence 
slightly increases its diagnostic value. Id. The case against a suspect based solelyon a DNA-databank 
match arguably may be weaker than a case based on other evidence in addition 10 DNA evidence, but 
not because the databank match itself is less probative. 
17. Jonathan J. Koehler, ErrorandExaggeration in the Presenlation ofDNA Evidence at Trial. 
34 JURlMETRlCS J. 21 (I 993)(quoting from the transcript ofBcthune v. State, 821 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1991». 
18. Eine Hundertprozentige Sicherheit, Ihn Zu IdentifIZieren (With 100% Certainty, 11 
Identifies Hirn), FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZElTIJNG, Apr. 14, 1998, at 13. 
19. DNA Fingerprinting Comes ofAge, 278 SCIENCE 1407 (Constance Holden cd., 1998). 
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This may lead judges to misunderstand it similarly in their opinions as, for 
exarnple, "the probability ofsomeone else leaving" the genetic trace.20 
II. STATISTICALTHINKING 
All this confusion is consistent with three decades of research fmding that 
people have difficulty understanding probabilities, and not just because 
expressing probabilities in naturallanguage can be confusing.21 Countless studies 
show people struggling in the face ofprobabilities and falling short ofnonnative 
standards,22 routinely confusing, for example, the probability that a hypothesis H 
is true, given a certain piece ofevidence E, orp(HJE), with the probability that a 
certain piece of evidence occurs given the truth of a particular hypothesis, or 
p(EIH), and conflating conditional probabilities with conjunctive ones.2J 
These fmdings are particularly gennane to DNA evidence because the 
probative value ofthis evidence hinges on conditional probabilities. Ajudge or 
juror faced with a DNA match must detennine how likely it is that the person 
whose DNA profile matches the incriminating profile is actually the source ofthe 
incriminating evidence. But how likely that is depends, arnong other things, on the 
frequency ofthe DNA profile in the population. For this reason, likelihood ratios 
incorporating that frequency have been recommended to indicate the significance 
ofDNA evidence.24 
A likelihood ratio compares the probability offmding the evidence under one 
hypothesis with the probability offinding that same evidence under its opposite.25 
In fonnal tenns, the ratio is 
P{EI~J' 
pEIH 
the ratio ofthe probabilities ofthe evidence E under the alternative hypotheses of 
Hand H. But with DNA evidence, the ultimate concern is the ratio of the 
transposed conditional probabilities, given the DNA match, what is the relative 
Iikelihood that the defendant is the source: 
P~IE~. 
pHIE 
20.Wilson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 905, 807 (Ark. 1998). 
21. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: 
Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLD. L. REv. 859 (1996); William C. 
Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation ofStatistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The 
Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987). 
22. Arnos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURJSTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1985). 
23. HofIrage et aI., supra note 5; Kaye & Koehler, supra note 6. 
24. NRC II, supra note 4, at 127-29. 
25. See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977) (suggesting 
that under Federal Rule ofEvidence 401, evidence would be relevant as long as the likelihood ratio 
'f- 1.0). 
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Bayes' Theorem bridges the inference from the one ratio to the other. The 
relative likelihood ofthe hypotheses, given the evidence, is the product ofthe fIrst 
likelihood ratio and some prior estimate of the relative probability of the two 
hypotheses: 
P~I E~ = PfmX PtEI H}.pHIE pH pEIH 
ScientifIc disagreement over calculating these probability estimates and 
likelihood ratios has largely abated,26 but some statistical issues remain. The 
National Academy of Sciences has twice evaluated the use of forensic DNA 
analysis,27 but the two evaluations disagree on various points and leave some 
questions unresolved. Two areas ofparticular importance are the signifIcance of 
DNA matches identifled through DNA databanks28 and the ability ofjudges and 
jurors to understand the signifIcance ofDNA matches when different methods of 
presentation are used.29 The following sections explore and present fIndings from 
psychological research that address these issues. 
Irr. PRESENTATION 
A. Focus and Frame 
One ofthe earliest studies ofthe effects ofpresenting statistical evidence in 
different ways documented a common confusion mentioned earliero by giving 
mock jurors expert testimony in one of two written forms. The fIrst form stated 
that there is only a two percent chance the defendant's hair would be indistin­
guishable from that ofthe perpetrator ifhe were innocent.3' The other form stated 
that only 2% ofthe people have hair that would be indistinguishable from that of 
the defendant and in a city of 1,000,000 people there would be 20,000 such 
individuals. Jurors were much less likely to convict when given the latter version. 
These forms of presenting a statistic exhibit two characteristics that have a 
systematic effect on how people understand lind use statistical evidence.J2 The 
26. See Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowie, DNA Fingerprin/ing Dispu/e Laid /0 Rest, 371 
NATURE 735 (1994). 
27. NRC U, supra note 4, at I; Richard Lempert, After /he DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRC 
H, 37 JURlMETRlCS J. 439 (1997). 
28. NRC 11, supra note 4, at 39-40; Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 4. 
29. NRC 11, supra note 4, at 174, 192-99,203--04. 
30. See Thompson & Schumann, supra note 21, at 177 (stating that a deputy district attomey 
believed that, if a deTendant has a trait found in only a small sampie of a population, e.g., 1%, then 
the probability that the defendant is guilty is 99%). 
31.This form states a conditional probability of a match assuming the defendant is innocent. 
As discussed ear1ier, this sortofstatement may be misleading because, even ifthe defendant is indeed 
the source ofthe indistinguishable hair, the question ofguilt or innocence requires more than physical 
evidence. 
32. There are, of course, many ways to present a particular piece of evidence, and DNA 
statistics will be interpreted in light ofthe circumstances surrounding their presentation. Choices of 
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first fonn focuses on the individual defendant and states the probability ofa single 
event, whereas the second fonnulation focuses on other people and states how 
many ofthem have a particular trait. 33 In aseries ofstudies,34 Koehler found that 
when the DNA match statistic is "framed in the language of probability (e.g., 
0.1 %) in a way that highlights a particular suspect's chance of matching by 
coincidence, it tends to be persuasive" evidence that the suspect is the source; 
"[b]ut when the statistic is framed in the language offrequencies (e.g., one in one 
thousand) in a way that highlights the chance that others will match by coinci­
dence, it is much less persuasive.'l35 Similarly, match statistics that target an 
individual suspect are more persuasive than the equivalent statistic that targets a 
broader population.36 
To cite another example, compare the two different but mathematically 
comparable expressions of a I in 1,000 DNA-match statistic: ''The probability 
that the suspect would match the blood specimen if he were not the source is 
0.1 %" versus "One in one thousand people in Houston who are not the source 
would also match the blood specimen."l7 Once again, the fonner focuses on an 
individual suspect and states the probability of a match, while the latter focuses 
on other people and states the frequency of the matching trait. As before, mock 
jurors were less likely to convict based on the latter wording than they were based 
on the fonner. J8 
Tbe latter statement directly cues people to think about the other people 
besides the individual suspect who might also match, and the findings suggest that 
people judge the probative value of a DNA match based on, among other things, 
presentation organize the facts, focus attention, force associations and discriminations, and bring out 
reJationships that may be illuminating, intriguing, subtJe, or banal. Expert testimony is one example, 
and much cou1d be made ofthe incidental influenccs lurking in just these !Wo sentences. For example, 
the first statement invokes the subjunctive mood with an implication about the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant. See generally HOWARD SCHUMAN & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
IN ATTITIJDESURVEYS: EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION FORM, WORDINGANDCONTEXT. (1981); Denis. 
J. Hilton, The Social Con/ex/ ofReasoning: ConversationalInference and Rational Judgmen/. 118 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 248 (1995); Norbert Schwarz et aI., Base Rates, Represenla/iveness, and the Logic 
ofColTVersation: The Con/exlual Relevance of "Irrelevant" Information, 9 Soc. COGNITION 67 
(1991). 
33. Cf LEONARDJ. SAVAGE, THEFoUNDATlONS OF STATISTICS (2d ed. 1972); RICHARD VON 
MISES, PROBABILITY, STATlSTlCS AND TRum (2d ed. 1957); Hoffrage et aI., supra note 5; Daniel 
Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk 
Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17 (1993). 
34. Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology ofNumbers in the Courtroom: How 10 Make DNA­
Match Statistics Seem Impressive orInsufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 1275, 1278 (2001). Others have 
contributed as weil. See, e.g., David L. Faigman & AJ. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in Ihe Trial 
Process, 12LAw&HuM. BEHAV. 1(1988); Jane Goodman,Jurors'ComprehensionandAssessment 
ofProbabi/is/ic Evidence, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 361 (1992); Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman 
Diarnond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAW&HUM. BEHAv. 159 
(1999). 






38. Koehler, supra note 34. 
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how readily others who might also match come to mind. The more people are 
aware ofothers who might also match, the less compelling the evidence will seem, 
and vice versa.39 Strikingly, the majority of sampie jurors provided with the first 
statement above were "99% certain" that the suspect was the source of the 
evidentiary sampie, while more than a third who were provided with the second 
statement were equally convinced that the suspect was not the source. 
Unless the subjects who were "99% certain" that the defendant was the 
source thought that the prior probability was very low (e.g., less than 10%), its 
combination with the DNA-match statistic generally should have produced higher 
posterior probability estimates than those reported.40 This is in line with previous 
studies showing that people do not usually conform to Bayesian rules when 
reasoning with probabilities.41 Research over the past decade, however, has 
identified a way to improve statistical reasoning.42 
B. Natural Frequencies 
Expressions of probabilities that are mathematically equivalent are not 
necessarily psychologically equivalent. Probabilities expressed as non-normalized 
frequencies of conjunctive events sampled from a single population, which are 
more like simple counts, are more easily understood than are fractions bounded 
by zero and one. We may call such frequencies with their original numerators and 
denominators "natural frequencies. ,,43 
In the case ofDNA evidence, the probability that someone randomly selected 
would have a particular DNA profile must be combined with the probabilities of 
finding a match for both those who share that profile and those who do not. For 
individuals who are not skilled in or aware of the use of Bayes' Theorem, 
combining these probabilities is simpler and easier ifthey are expressed as natural 
frequencies rather than as standardized or relative frequencies. The reason why 
is that converting natural frequencies into probabilities eliminates the base rate of 
the DNA profile in the relevant population.44 
39. To disentangle the etTect offocusing on the individual versus some group ofolhers from the 
etTect of stating a probability versus a frequency, Koehler, id., employed two other expressions 
yielding less extreme effects: "The frequency with which the suspect would match the bJood specimen 
if he were not the source is one in one thousand." and "One tenth of one percent of the people in 
Houston who are not the source would also match the blood specimen." ld. at 1278. The results 
indicate that targeting an individual and stating a probability is the most compelling form of the 
evidence and lhat targeting others and stating a frequency is the least compelling. Conviction rates 
for those who were given both express ions of the evidence were in between these extremes. These 
etTects, however, appear to vary with the value of the DNA match statistic, wilh tower frequencies 
leading to higher conviction rates. 
40. Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by DNA Ma/ch Sta/islics?, 25 LAw & 
HUM. BEHAV. 493,503 (2001). 
41. Kaye & Koehler, supra note 6; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 22. 
42. HotTrage et a1., supra note 5. 
43. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich HotTrage, Overcoming Difficulties in Bayesian Reasoning: 
A Reply 10 Lewis & Keren and Meilers & McGraw, 106 PSYCHOL. REv. 425 (1999). 
44. The conversion neutralizes the base rates by setting them to the same value (e.g., 100). 
154 43 JURlMETRlCS 
Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence 
Consider the probability that a patient who tests positive on a diagnostic test 
for a disease actually has the disease. Ascertaining p(diseaselpositive) requires 
detennining how many people have the disease out ofall those who test positive: 
I 't' ) N(pQsitivetldisease) 45 p (dlsease' POSl lve . 
N(positive) 
That proportion hinges on how common the disease is, as weil as the chance of 
a positive result for someone who has the disease and the chance of a positive 
result for someone who does not have the disease. 
With DNA evidence, the comparable inference involves the proportion of 
people who have a certain DNA profile out of all those who appear to match in 
a DNA analysis: 
N(profilenmatch) 46 p (profil1 eImatch)= . N(match) 
If a particular DNA profile occurs in a population of 10 million with a frequency 
of one in a million, for example, one might expect approximately 10 people to 
share that DNA profile. But ifthe chances offalse-positive laboratory errors are 
as high as sometimes estimated:7 then there could be some 30,000 people in the 
population without that DNA profile who would nonetheless match in DNA 
analyses. Thus, without any other incriminating evidence, if someone is said to 
share a DNA profile with a forensie sampie, the conditional probability of that 
suspect sharing the profile given the match, that iS,p(profilelmatch) is equal to 10 
out of30,01O. 
Probabilities and frequencies name the same rational nurnbers, but natural 
frequencies lay bare the nurnerical dependencies required for Bayesian inference. 
Because these frequencies are mathematically equivalent toprobabilities, the 
Bayesian bridge of statistical inference spans both. But the equivalent computa­
tion with probabilities requires that the base rates48 be computed and multiplied 
together with conditional probabilities to get a correct answer: 
p(profile)p(matchlprofile)p (profilI ematcI h) . p(profile)p(matchlprofile)+p(profile)p(match/profile) 
However, frequencies require only a count ofthe people who would actually have 
the profile out of all the people who match: 
45. In this expression, N (positive n disease) indicates the number ofindividuals with a positive 
test result and the disease. N(positive) is the number with a positive test result. 
46. As in the previous equation, N refers to the number ofindividuals with the characteristics 
noted in parentheses. 
47. See supra notes 10 & 12. 
48. The base rates are the frequency ofthe profile and its complemenl, i.e., the number ofthose 
who do and those who do not share the matching profile. 
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L fil.J h) N(match n profile)PWrol~m~c = . 
N(match) 
In other words, natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian reasoning because part of 
the calculation is already "done" by the form of presentation itself. 
As noted earlier,49 however, notjust any variety offrequency expression will 
facilitate Bayesian inference. Normalized frequencies do not facilitate Bayesian 
inference. 5o Nevertheless, some authors have not been sensitive to the 
distinction,51 and others have made new distinctions, such as "information type" 
versus "information structure"S2 or "partitive" versus "nonpartitive" formats,5J 
which redescribe the distinctive properties of natural frequencies. Natural 
frequencies should not be confused with other kinds of frequencies. Natural 
frequencies are non-normalized counts of conjunctive events sampled from a 
single population, and they therefore retain the leverage of the base-rates and 
simplify Bayesian calculations. 
Because Bayesian calculations are so much simpler with natural frequencies, 
using these expressions could offset confusion surrounding statistical analyses and 
help judges and jurors understand the uncertainties associated with DNA 
evidence. Perhaps a more transparent way ofpresenting the statistics would afford 
a better understanding of the evidence itself. 
49. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich HolTrage, How 10 Improve Bayesian Reasoning Wilhoul 
Inslruclion: Frequency Formals, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 684 (1995). 
50. See id. 
51. E.g., Jonathan SI. B.T. Evans et al., Frequency Versus Probability Formals in Sialislical 
Word Problems, 77 COGNITION 197 (2000). Here, normalized frequencies (calied "frequency 
formats-hard") do not improve Bayesian reasoning. 
52. Vittorio Girotto & Michel Gonzalez, Solving Probabilislic and Sialis/ical Problems: A 
Mal/er ofInformalion Slruclure and Queslion Form, 78 COGNITION 247 (2001). The information 
type is either frequencies or probabilities, with no distinction between natural frequencies and other 
types. Information structure depends on whether relevant conjunctive events are given. The authors 
suggest that information structure, rather than type, facilitates Bayesian inference. Yet this 
information structure is exactly what natural frequencies provide. 
53. Laura Macchi, Parlitive Formulation 0/Information in Probabilistic Problems: Beyond 
Heurislics and Frequency Formal Explanalions, 82 ORGANIZAll0NAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 217 (2000). Here, problems with a frequentist formulation in partitive format produced 
a high percentage of Bayesian responses, whereas problems in nonpartitive format produced a high 
percentage of non-Bayesian responses, implying that u a frequentist fonnulation is not the crucial 
element for eliciting correct reasoning." Id. at 225. True enough. Any kind offrequency formuJation 
will not work, and the result is to be expected since nonpartitive frequencies are not sarnpled from 
a single population, whereas partitive frequencies are. 
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IV. EXPERIMENT: SAME EVIDENCE-
DIFFERENT EXPRESSIONS 
A. Design and Method 
To investigate this possibility, we asked a sampIe of 127 advanced law 
students and 27 professional jurists in Gennany to evaluate two realistic criminal 
court rape case files. 54 In one case the victim had first identified the defendant, 
whose DNA profile then matched that ofsampIes recovered from the crime scene. 
In the other case, however, a DNA match was found through a DNA databank that 
contained a sampIe from the defendant. Aside from the DNA match, there was 
Iittle reason to suspect the defendant was the perpetrator, and in neither case was 
the victim absolutely sure that the defendant was the rapist. 
In each case, an expert who performed a DNA analysis testified that the 
particular DNA profile recovered from the crime scene occurred in one in a 
million (0.0001%) Caucasians. The expert also testified that it was practically 
certain that the DNA analysis would find a match if a person actually has a 
matching DNA profile (i.e., true-positive result). Prompted by the defense, he also 
reported the rates oftechnical and human mishaps leading to false-positive results 
in laboratory proficiency tests. 55 
This numerical infonnation, however, was presented as expert testimony in 
two different fonnats. One fonnat stated all the infonnation as probabilities (e.g., 
0.0001%), and the other format stated it as natural frequencies (e.g., I out of 
1,000,000). That was the only difference.56 
After reading the expert testimony in one or the other fonnat, each participant 
was asked to provide two probabilities. The first question asked for the probabil-
ity that someone said to match in the DNA analysis would actually have the DNA 
profile in question: p(profile[match). The second question asked for the 
probability that someone said to match in the DNA analysis is the source ofthe 
trace recovered from the crime scene: p(sourcelmatch). Immediately after 
answering these two questions, the participants were asked to render a verdict of 
guilty or not guilty. 
After examining one case file in either a frequency or probability fonnat, 
each participant was given a second case file in which the expert testimony was 
in the other fonnat. They then answered the same questions as before. All 
participants were randomly assigned to conditions·where the different fonnats of 
expert testimony (frequency or probability), their order (first or second), and the 
type ofcase (databank hit or witness identification) were all varied systematically 
54. In Germany, a sealed criminal court file (S/rafak/en) documents the course of the legal 
proceeding from the initiation ofcharges to the final disposition ofthe court. Our case files matched 
actual case files in all respects except those requiring experimental manipulation and anonyrnity of 
the panies. 
55. The rates were an average of error rates once found in actual proficiency tests of DNA 
laboratories. See Koehler et 31., supra note 10, at 205-11. 
56. An example of the expert testimony in each format is in the Appendix, as the rest of the 
material in the case files was extensive and detailed but otherwise identicaf in every respecl. 
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and counterbalanced. To boost motivation, we offered a monetary incentive for 
better perfonnance. Two-thirds ofthe student sampie received a flat fee, and one 
third received a slightly smaller flat fee but with bonuses for each correct 
numerical response. 
B. Results and Discussion 
We found that the same DNA evidence had dramatically different effects in 
the different fonnats on both statistical reasoning and decision-making. Consistent 
with previous findings,S7 the same evidence always led to higher conviction rates 
in the probability fonnat than in the frequency format. The proportion of guilty 
verdicts in the probability format was 50 to ]00 percent greater than the 
proportion ofguilty verdicts in the frequency format in every condition. Figure I 
shows the overall pattern ofresults combined across all conditions. Although the 
case involving eyewitness identification always garnered more guiltyverdicts than 
the case based solelyon a databank match, these differences were not statistically 
significant. S8 It appears, then, that the differing expressions of the statistical 
evidence had a stronger impact than the kind ofevidence. 
Figure 1 
60 .,.,.--.--.-r---------....., 
54.:5% o Probabilities 







Law Students Jurists 
Proportion of "Guilty" VerdictlI 
The disparate outcomes in the different numericaI formats were likely due to 
a disparate understanding ofthe statistical evidence. All participants had to infer 
57. Koehler, supra notes 21, 34 & 40. 
58. All ofthe findings presented, except this one, are statistieally significant using a X', p < 05 
standard. Overall, 53% retumed guilty vcrdiets in thc witncss-identification esse wheress 48% did 
so in the databank-hit esse. 
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the conditional probabilities of(l) having a DNA profile given a DNA match and 
(2) being the source of the eVldence given the match. In general, across all 
conditions there were far more correct answers in the frequency format than in the 
probability format, irrespective of the type ofcase or monetary incentive.59 Only 
one of the students and a few of the professionals could derive the correct 
probabilities in the probability format, whereas, by contrast, about 40 to 50 
percent of the law student sampie and 70 to 75 percent of the jurist sampie 













p(Profile) p(Source) p(Profile} p(Source) 
Law Students lurists 
Proportion of Bayesian Responses (in %) 
These response patterns were no different for those who were paid more for 
deriving the correct answers. Indeed, most participants, regardless of payment 
condition, spent about two hours evaluating the cases, so the incorrect answers in 
the probability format were not for lack oftrying.60 
S9. The offer of additional payment di d make the noles wrinen on seraIch paper more 
numerically oriented, typically wilh those paid for performance anempting various misguided 
calculations in the probability format and then giving up. 
60. The time spent ranged from 0:55 to 2:45, wilh an average of I hour and 3S minutes. Mosl 
ofthis time was used on the malerials in the probability format, although the time needed to complete 
lhe tasles in lhe separate formats was not measured. 
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In contrast, the correct Bayesian answers in the frequency fonnat often came 
easily, without need for pencil and paper calculations. When the evidence was 
expressed as frequencies, those who answered correctly seemed to grasp the 
structure of the Bayesian problem, albeit without fully understanding the 
mathematics, since these same participants could not derive the correct answers 
in a probability fonnat that was mathematically equivalent. 
While the correct answers in the frequency fonnat required no written 
calculations, the calculations attempted in the probability fonnat were unifonnly 
misguided. The most common numerical operation in the probability fonnat was 
subtracting the base rate of the DNA profile from 100% or subtracting the false 
positive error rate from 100%. The most common alternative was simply to restate 
one of the statistics mentioned in the expert testimony. These two types of 
responses account for nearly all the numerical responses in the probability fonnat. 
Subtracting the base rate of the DNA profile fröm 100% accounts for 50 to 60 
percent of the probability format responses (e.g., 99.999%) and restating a 
statistic mentioned in the testimony accounts for another 35 to 40 percent (e.g., 
.0001%).61 
These results are all the more surprising because halfofthe participants saw 
the statistical evidence expressed as natural frequencies almost irn.mediately 
before having to evaluate that same evidence expressed as probabilities-and, 
again, the statistics in the two fonnats were mathematically identical. They were 
not psychologically identical, however, and not without potential legal conse-
quences. 
V.IMPLICATIONS 
If judges and jurors are to evaluate DNA evidence, they should understand 
that a forensic DNA analysis can identify a potential source of incriminating 
evidence, but not with certainty. The inherent uncertainty depends on the different 
population frequencies ofdifferent DNA profiles and the possibility oflaboratory 
error, although anomalies such as police misconduct or planted evidence are also 
possible. Judges and jurors should understand the statistics surrounding both of 
these inherent uncertainties and their significance to a DNA match. Their 
understanding may be helped or hindered by different ways of expressing those 
statistics. 
Experts and nonexperts alike are easily confused by statistics expressed as 
probabilities. But this confusion diminishes when the same statistics are expressed 
as natural frequencies. We found that presenting the same statistical evidence as 
natural frequencies rather than conditional probabilities dramatically increased the 
proportion of correct statistical inferences by trained legal decisionmakers and 
influenced the verdicts in each case. 
61. These kinds of erroneous responses are comparable to those found in other studies 
conceming probabilistic reasoning. Cf Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note49; Kaye & Koehler, supra 
note 6. 
43 JURIMETRICS 160 
Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence 
Different expressions of the statistical evidence, which was the only 
difference in the evidence in each case, significantly changed the likelihood of 
conviction.62 That is most likely because confusion generated by the probability 
expressions leads people to infer that the posterior probability that the defendant 
is the source is much higher than it actually is, while the clarity maintained in the 
frequency expressions leads them to infer that the posterior probability is lower, 
and therefore less incriminating, since it is appropriately weighted with the 
population frequency ofthe DNA profile. Any inference that neglects the profile 
frequency will produce erroneously high probability estimates.63 
When statistics were expressed as natural frequencies rather than probabili-
ties, more people could, without instruction, successfully combine the population 
frequency of the DNA profile with the rates of laboratory error to derive the 
correct conditional probability ofsomeone being the source ofthe incriminating 
DNA evidence-the ultimate meaning of a DNA match. Understanding that 
meaning and the statistical uncertainties will not guarantee that the evidence is 
evaluated appropriately, but it would seem to be a crucial first step. Dur 
experiments suggest that the natural frequency express ions reveal the Bayesian 
structure that links these uncertainties. Clarifying this structure for legal 
decisionmakers might alleviate considerable confusion. 
Beyond the statistics, though, other evidence besides a DNA match is also 
important in deciding a case. Deciding whether a defendant is the true source of 
some matching DNA sampie, not to mention rendering a verdict, depends on other 
evidence, of which there may be plenty or precious little. The latter case is 
especially pertinent to matches found solely through searching DNA databanks 
when there is little other evidence. Dur results suggest that people may be as 
likely to convict based solelyon a DNA match taken from a databank as they are 
based on a confmnatory match coupled with eyewitness identification. 64 Indeed, 
the different ways of presenting the same statistical evidence had a much greater 
impact on the tendency to convict than even eyewitness identification did. 
Probability express ions sharply increased conviction rates in comparison with 
62. Both the probability format and frequency format used here cued people directly to think 
of others who could also match in the analysis. Cf Koehler, supra notes 34& 40. 
63. Koehler, supra note 40, assessed sampie jurors' understanding ofa 1 in 1000 (0.1 %) match 
statistic by asking them how many others would also match in a city of500,000 and found that 60.7% 
versus 42.1 % of subjects gave the correct answer in the frequency versus the probability formats. 
64. In Regina v. Adams, (1998] I Cr. App. R. 377 (Eng. C.A. 1997), the only evidence linking 
the defendant to a rape was a DNA match (and his residing in the general area where the rape 
occurred). Even though he did not, according to the victim,look very similar to the actual rap ist, and, 
even though he presented an alibi that could be corroborated, he was convicted on the basis ofthe 
DNA evidence. Thus, ifsomeone who does not resemble the assailant can be convicted on the basis 
of a DNA match alone, then it would seem even more Iikely that someone who does resemble the 
assailant could be wrongfully convicted on that basis together with eyewitness testimony, especially 
considering the notorious prevalence ofeyewitness identification error. See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. 
Bradford, Disloriions in Eyewilnesses' Recolleclions: Can lhe Poslidentificalion-Feedback EjJecl 
Be Moderated, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 138 (1999); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race 
EjJecl in Eyewilness Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAw 230 
(2001). 
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frequency expressions regardless of whether the DNA match was found through 
a databank or was coupled with eyewitness testimony. Beginning with a DNA 
match may be unfairly prejudicia1.65 There is also the danger of constructing a 
case to augment the match with the bias ofhindsight66 and a shifting focus toward 
confirmatory evidence.67 
Since the chance ofa coincidental DNA match increases with the number of 
sampies analyzed, the population frequency of the DNA profile should be 
multiplied by the size of the databank to retlect the new chance of a random 
match. But that does not affect the chance oflaboratory error or its relation to the 
new chance ofa coincidental match.68 The chance ofa laboratory error is usually 
greater than the chance of a coincidental match, but it could be the other way 
around given a databank large enough. 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court has said courts should consider the "known or 
potential rate oferror,,69 before admitting scientific evidence, arguments involving 
these statistics may become more common. 70 Representing those statistics one 
way or another does not matter from a mathematical point ofview, but it should 
matter from psychological and judicial point of view. When verdicts hinge on 
DNA evidence, understanding that evidence is crucial, and how it is presented 
may make an important difference. 
65. Cf FED. R. EVID. 403. 
66. Barueh Fisehhoff, Hindsight .. Foresight: The Eifect ofOutcome Knowledge on Judgement 
Untier Uncerlainty, 1 1. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 
(1975). 
67. R1CHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF 
SOCIALJUDGMENT 167-92 (1980). 
68. In a belween-subjeets sampIe of 20 university students given only the ease materials 
involving a databank hit from the experiments reponed earlier, 19 suecessfully multiplied a profile 
frequeney ofone in a million by a databank sizc of500,000, with 60% then going on in the frequeney 
format ~o infer the eorrcct condilional probability of the defendant's being the source of the 
evidentiary sampie. As always, the difficulty of any caleulation will vary with the speeifie numbers 
in question-whieh is a moot point if a calculator is allowed. 
69. Dauben v. Merrcll Dow Pharms., Ine., 509 D.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
70. In Wil/iams v. Slate, 679 A.2d. 1106 (Md. 1996), the coun ofappeaJs reversed the trial court 
for not allowing more extensive questioning about laboratory proficiency tests and the possibility of 
contamination in a laboratory.ld at 1120. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Probability Format 
In a country the size ofGennany there are as many as 10 million men who fit 
the description ofthe perpetrator. The probability ofa randomly selected person 
having a DNA profile that matches the trace recovered from the crime scene is 
.0001%. Ifsomeone has this DNA profile it is practically certain that this kind of 
DNA analysis would show a match. The probability that someone who does not 
have this DNA profile would match in this type ofDNA analysis is .001%. In this 
case, the DNA profile ofthe sampie from the defendant matches the DNA profile 
ofthe trace recovered from the crime scene. 
B. Frequency Format 
In a country the size ofGermany there are as manY as 10 million men who fit 
the description ofthe perpetrator. Approximately 10 ofthese men would have a 
DNA profile that matches the trace recovered from the crime scene. If someone 
has this DNA profile it is practically certain that this kind ofDNA analysis would 
show a match. Ofthe some 9,999,990 people who do not have this DNA profile, 
approximately 100 would be shown to match in this type ofDNA analysis. In this 
case, the DNA profile ofthe sampie from the defendant matches the DNA profile 
ofthe trace recovered from the crime scene. 
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EI)ITOR~S PREFACE 
This issue of Jurimetrics, The Journal 01 Law, Science, and Technology 
includes articles on the psychology of evidence, I medical records and privacy,2 
genetic research and bioethics,3 and the computation of lost profits in patent 
infringement cases.4 Inasmuch as these papers confront difficult issues and stake 
out new positions, we expect them to prompt further debate and a better 
understanding of the questions they seek to answer. 
The many legally trained readers ofJurimetrics should appreciate the merits 
of the legal and ethical arguments in several of these articles with no further 
editorial gloss. However, the psychological experiment, previously reported in 
substantiaUy less detail in Science,s may be less accessible to the modal reader. 
For this reason, a few comments on the analysis seem appropriate. In 
Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence, Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig, and 
Gerd Gigerenzer discuss the presentation of probabilities associated with DNA 
and other trace evidence. They propose using "natural frequencies" rather than 
decimals or percentages,6 especially when a defendant has been identified by 
searching through a database of DNA profiles from convicted offenders. The 
research adds to our understanding ofhow the manner in which trace evidence is 
presented affects assessments ofthat evidence.7 The authors report that students 
and judges given a written description of certain evidence return fewer guilty 
1. Samuel Lindsey cl a1., Communicating Statistieal DNA Evidence, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 147 
(2003). 
2. Wendy J. Netter, Curing the Unique Health Identifier: A Reconciliation ofNew Techn%g)! 
and Privacy RighJs, 43 JURJMETRICS J. 165 (2003). 
3. David E. Winickoff, Governing Population Genomies: Law, Bioethics, and Biopolities in 
Three Case Sludies, 43 JURIMIITRICS J. 187 (2003). 
4. element G. Krouse, But-For Markets and Reasonable Royalties: The Rite-Hite v. Kelley 
Misdirection, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 229 (2003). 
5. Ulrich Hoffrage et a1., Communicating Statistical Information, 290 SCIENCE 2261 (2000). 
6. The authors define "natural frequencies" as "[p]robabilities expressed as non-normalized 
frequencies of conjunctive events sampled from a single population ...." Lindsey et w., supra note 
I, at 154. An example would be "ten out of the ten million people in the city" rather than "0.000001." 
7. For another recent and more comprehensive study on this general issue, see Dale A Nance 
& Scott B. Morris, An Empiriea/ Assessment of Presentation Formats for Traa! Evidena! with a 
Re/atively Large and Quantifiable &ndom Match Probabüity, 42 JURIMI!TRJCS J. 403 (2002). 
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verdicts and arrive at the correct figure for particular probabilities much more 
often when relevant probabilities are presented as "natural frequencies."s 
In interpreting this finding, the precise meaning of "natural frequencies" 
must be appreciated. The experiment involves more than the translation of 
decimal numbers such as 0.000 1% into fractions such as 1 in a million. The 
subjects in the "frequency condition" were told the number of men in the 
population who actually possess the incriminating DNA type-that is, the number 
of true positives. They were told how many men who do not possess the type 
would be erroneously reported to have it-the number offalse positives. Because 
they were provided such numbers rather than mere frequencies, they did not have 
to understand the tricky concept of conditional probability to fmd the posterior 
probability.9 All that was necessary was to divide the specified number offalse 
positives by the total number of positives. In contrast, the subjects in the 
"probability condition" were given no elues as to how to transpose a conditional 
probability.'o Whether merely presenting the statistical information as frequencies 
expressed as natural numbers would have the same effect as giving the numbers 
oftrue and false positives in a particular population therefore remains unknown. 
A second. facet of the paper also warrants abrief comment. The authors 
suggest that the probative value of a DNA match depends greatly on (1) whether 
the defendant is identified by searching a database of DNA types of convicted 
offenders, as opposed to (2) whether the defendant is identified on the basis of 
non-DNA evidence, and then the DNA match is made. They write that in the 
initial database-search case, "the population frequency ofthe DNA profile should 
be multiplied by the size of the databank to reflect the new chance of a ... 
coincidental match.,,11 An accompanying footnote states that "the correct 
conditional probability of the defendant's being the source of the evidentiary 
sampie" requires multiplication by the "databank size.,,12 As discussed in a 
symposium in this journal, however, this supposed correction is controversial at 
best. 13 Thoughtful statisticians have argued strongly that when the hypothesis in 
8. See Lindsey et a1., supra note 1, at 158-59. This result is consistent with other findings 
reported by Gigerenzer and his colleagues at the Max Planck Institute. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & 
Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102 
PSYCHOL. REv. 684 (1995); cf Craig R Callen, Informational Indigestion and !rrationality, 41 
]URIMETRICS]. 513 (2001) (reviewing SIMPLE HEURISTICS THATMAKE Us SMART (Gerd Gigerenzer 
et al. eds., 1999». 
9. Cf Lindsey et al., supra note 1, at 156 ("natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian reasoning 
because part ofthe calculation is a1ready 'done' ....n). 
10. The procedure required to arrive at the answers counted as correct apparently involves 
Bayes' theorem, an initial assumption that all men are equally Iikely to be the source of the DNA 
found a1 the crime scene, and a further assumption involving the independence of having a particular 
DNA type and the commission of the crime. 
I 1. Lindsey et al., supra noo: 1, at 162. 
12. Id. a1 162 n.68. 
13. Symposium, The Evaluation ofForensic DNA Evidence, 37 ]URIMETRICS 1. 395 (1997). 
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question is whether the defendant is the source, such multiplication is grossly 
incorrect. 14 
These statistical and psychological issues, like the bioethical and economic 
questions in the other articles in this issue, are far from trivial. They require 
careful analysis and explication for the legal system intelligently to regulate 
science and technology and to apply scientific methods to its own needs. As such, 
we look forward to publishing further dialogue on these topics. 
March 2003 -D.H. Kaye 
Editor 
14. See, e.g., David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., DNA Typing, in 3 MODERN 
SCIENTIFlC EVIDI!NCE § 25-2.6.2[3][d], at 277-78 (David 1. Faigman et a1. eds., 2d ed. 2002) 
(describing and citing this Jiterature). 
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